The Army, UN Peacekeeping Mission and Democracy in Bangladesh. by Islam, Nurul
MPRA
Munich Personal RePEc Archive
The Army, UN Peacekeeping Mission
and Democracy in Bangladesh.
Nurul Islam
2010
Online at http://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/24312/
MPRA Paper No. 24312, posted 11. August 2010 11:06 UTC
 SPECIAL ARTICLE
Economic & Political Weekly EPW  july 17, 2010 vol xlv no 29 77
The Army, UN Peacekeeping Mission  
and Democracy in Bangladesh
Nurul Islam
Nurul Islam (N.ISLAM@CGIAR.ORG) is former deputy chairman of the 
Bangladesh Planning Commission. 
This article examines the role of the United Nations 
peacekeeping mission in Bangladesh in pushing the 
army in a certain direction with regard to holding 
elections and supporting political parties. It analyses the 
reasons why the un peacekeeping mission has such a 
strong influence on the Bangladesh army and assesses 
the implications for future political developments of 
such foreign involvement. It further argues that 
whatever the limitations and excesses of democracy, 
army rule is no solution, rather it is necessary to 
strengthen democractic institutions and let democratic 
processes play themselves out. In this sense, the 
recourse to the army to bring in democracy in 
Bangladesh was not the best solution to the political 
impasse witnessed in 2007. 
During the latter part of 2006, when elections were due to be held in Bangladesh, serious disagreements surfaced between the then ruling party, which was due to hand 
power over to the caretaker government, and the opposition 
party, over the appointment of the chief adviser of the caretaker 
government, and of the chief of the Election Commission, as well 
as the necessary revision of the voting rolls. The opposition con-
sidered both these functionaries to be too closely allied with the 
ruling party and demanded that they should be substituted by 
neutral persons acceptable to both parties. As the ruling party 
refused any concessions on these points, the opposition staged 
protests and demonstrations. The resulting confrontations be-
tween the followers of the two parties, as well as between the 
opposition party workers and the law-enforcing agencies, some-
times violent, threatened to bring normal life and economic 
a ctivities to a standstill. 
Nonetheless, Prime Minister Khaleda Zia was determined to 
hold the elections according to her predetermined schedule. 
The caretaker government was constituted and the president – 
who was an appointee of the ruling party – doubled up as the 
chief adviser or head of the caretaker government. It proceeded 
to hold the elections. On 9 December 2006, the president de-
ployed the armed forces throughout the country in the aid of 
the civil administration to maintain law and order. On the 
3 January 2007, the main opposition party and its allies 
d eclared that if their demands were not met they would not 
participate in the elections and would carry on their country-
wide agitation and protests.
Under these circumstances, elections could only be held by the 
use of force, including the military force, to violently suppress the 
opposition parties, which would have tried to obstruct the hold-
ing of elections. On 10 January 2007 the army was entrusted with 
the duty of taking into custody, without any warrant of arrest, 
anyone interfering in the conduct of elections or in the process of 
voting. In other words, the responsibility for holding elections so 
as to deliver results in favour of the incumbent party was squarely 
put in the hands of the army.
Throughout this period, starting from the last months of 2006, 
diplomats of all the major world powers like the United States 
(US) and the European countries, including the European Union 
(EU), who incidentally are also among the biggest donors to 
B angladesh, urged a compromise. They held many meetings both 
with the prime minister and the leader of the opposition, to per-
suade them to reach an agreement but without success. At the 
same time, there were expressions of concern and appeals for a 
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p eaceful settlement of disagreements by the Secretary General of 
the United Nations, as well. 
However, Khaleda Zia was in no mood to submit to the pres-
sure by the donors, who, in the pre- and post-election civil strife, 
had a very plausible reason to discontinue aid. Not only were they 
major bilateral donors; they also had a decisive influence on the 
multilateral organisations which are the most important sources 
of external assistance to Bangladesh and could thus bring eco-
nomic life to a halt. It is remarkable that, in spite of Bangladesh’s 
heavy dependence on foreign aid, she decided to ignore the d irect 
pressure of the donor governments with an implied threat of a 
possible discontinuation 
of aid. 
It is possible to hypoth-
esise that based on past 
experience, when the le-
gitimacy or otherwise of 
a government that came 
to power through mili-
tary coups did not pre-
vent foreign powers from 
doing business as usual, 
Khaleda Zia thought that 
the donors would not be-
have any differently, spe-
cially since hers would 
be a c ivilian government, 
though installed through 
a managed election. She 
was confident of the mili-
tary’s unconditional support since the higher echelons of the army 
were appointed by her. 
Further, she might have reasoned that for the international com-
munity she represented a pro-western, conservative party, without 
any overt record of Islamic extremism or that of leftist demagogu-
ery. After all, she was well liked by the conservative governments 
of the Arab world, including Saudi Arabia, who are all close friends 
of western democracies like the US and the European countries. 
She, therefore, did not believe that the donors would actually dis-
continue aid. At worst, in her estimation, there could be a slow-
down of aid flow for a brief period. The donors would, necessarily, 
reconsider as they would be hard pressed to deprive a poor coun-
try like Bangladesh of aid for the long term. To “punish” the de-
prived masses of a poor country by the withdrawal of aid, because 
of the autocratic misdeeds of their rulers, has not been a very pop-
ular policy of western democracies in the past. 
Moreover, Bangladesh generated enough domestic resources 
to sustain the urgently required current expenditures of the pub-
lic sector, while in the short run, insofar as development expendi-
tures were considered, there was an accumulation of under-uti-
lised aid at the disposal of the government.
It is pertinent at this stage to ask why was the donor commu-
nity so eager to intervene in these internal political disputes and 
to pressure the army to intervene to stop the political impasse 
and violence. Why was the political turmoil of such interest to 
the donors as to invite active intervention by them? There are 
many countries in the world passing through such turmoils. The 
donors do not seem to intervene everywhere. One can hypo-
thesise some reasons:
First, political conflicts and the resulting socio-economic insta-
bility would hamper development work in a very poor country 
and hence aggravate poverty. A fragile state in south Asia, with a 
population of more than 150 million, is not conducive to peace 
and stability in the region as a whole. Further, this state of affairs 
would jeopardise the development assistance programmes of the 
donors. The aid establishments of the donor countries have an 
institutional interest in the continuation of their aid programmes 
and hence in political and economic stability.
Second, an alternative but related reason is that Bangladesh 
lies in the arc of Islamic countries stretching from Pakistan 
through Malaysia to Indonesia. The Afghan-Pakistan border re-
gion may be called the epicentre of extremist Islamic ideology. It 
has (a) a large number of Islamic schools, endowed with ample 
resources from the Gulf states, many of which are known to 
preach an extremist ideology; as well as (b) several terrorsist 
training centres, drawing recruits from many countries. If 
Bangla desh, given its close links with that region, slides into po-
litical turmoil and associated socio-economic instability, it would 
be vulnerable to the spread of extremist ideology and may serve 
as a conduit for the rise of extremist groups in south-east Asia. 
A lready, a few such groups, prone to violence, have been located 
in Bangladesh and its neighbouring countries.
Third, there are Maoist groups in India adjacent to Bangladesh 
and armed separatist groups in the north-eastern states of India. 
Instability in Bangladesh, contributing to the fragility of its state 
machinery, is likely to enlarge the area of operation of these 
groups and facilitate the supply of arms and ammunitions to 
them. A scenario like this, with a combination of all the above 
e lements, could likely threaten peace and stability in south and 
south-eastern Asia – a matter of some concern to the rest of the 
world, including the developed, western countries with far-flung 
and extensive trade and investment interests in Asia.
Intervention by UN Peacekeeping Office
Under these circumstances, the only way in which the major 
powers/donors could exercise effective pressure was to target 
where she was most vulnerable – the support of the army. The 
only leverage they had on the army was to threaten loss of oppor-
tunities to participate in UN peacekeeping missions, something 
which is highly coveted by the army in terms of both high status 
and considerable financial gain. 
Bangladesh’s participation in UN peacekeeping missions has 
been widely applauded at home and abroad, in the last several 
years. Participation in such missions not only enhanced the pres-
tige of the Bangladesh army abroad but also helped widen the 
range of its experience by exposing it to different societies as well 
as to the practices of the armies of different countries. Moreover, it 
has provided a substantial addition to the income of the participat-
ing army personnel. By rotation a large number of such soldiers 
and officers have participated in such missions (Table 1).1 
What was the evidence that the UN peacekeeping mission of-
fice, in fact, exerted such a pressure on the government? There 
 Table 1: Contributions to UN Peacekeeping 
Missions (2009)
Country	 Number	of	Members
(1) Pakistan 10,618
(2) Bangladesh 9,849
(3) India 8,612
(4) Nigeria 5,882
(5) Nepal 3,884
(6) Rwanda 3,585
(7) Ghana 3,412
(8) Jordan 3,231
(9) Egypt 2,902
(10) Italy 2,762
Another 107 member states  
of the United Nations contribute  
troops totalling  39,076
Grand total 93,813
Source: United Nations Peacekeeping Report, May 2009 
“Ranking of Military and Police Contributions to UN 
Operations”, http://www.un.org/Depts/dpko/dpko/
contributors/2009/may09_2.pdf. 
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were numerous newspaper reports and rumours, which were 
n either confirmed nor contested by the parties involved, espe-
cially the UN.2 During recent debates in parliament, a few law-
makers accused the UN of having supported an unelected govern-
ment by the army.3 
The only published report which can be called authentic, is the 
statement by the then army chief in his autobiography.4 There he 
narrates two incidents: one in which important donor govern-
ments met and told him that if the army helped in the holding of 
elections under the then prevailing circumstances, they would 
ask the UN peacekeeping office to reconsider or bar the recruit-
ment of Bangladesh army personnel in peacekeeping operations. 
The second incident took place subsequently on 10 January 2008, 
when the undersecretary general of the UN peacekeeping opera-
tions, Jean-Marie Guéhenno, conveyed the same ultimatum to 
the army chief, i e, the participation of the Bangladesh army in 
peacekeeping operations would be jeopardised if they helped in 
the holding of elections under the circumstances then prevailing. 
These statements of the army chief have neither been denied nor 
confirmed by the UN peacekeepers. It should be underlined that 
an undersecretary general of the UN could not have said this 
without the explicit approval of the UN secretary general.5
Questions have been raised whether the UN peacekeeping op-
erations office had the authority to exclude Bangladesh’s army 
from its missions on the grounds of its role in domestic political 
developments. On the basis of what is known in the public do-
main it is not possible to answer this question conclusively. It is, 
however, known that the decision on where to send the peace-
keeping forces lies with the UN General Assembly/Security Coun-
cil on the recommendations of the secretary general. The size of 
the peacekeeping missions and resources necessary to carry them 
out are also approved by the General Assembly. Once the deci-
sions are taken, it is left to the UN peacekeeping office to imple-
ment the decision by recruiting the appropriate size and composi-
tion of the peacekeeping forces from the countries which offer to 
contribute to such operations. 
The UN peacekeeping operations office invites contribution 
from member countries and the decision whether to participate, 
and to what extent, is left to the member countries. It decides the 
number of forces it seeks from a country, as well as the specific 
skills and categories the missions require in the field. Therefore, 
it is conceivable that a country willing to contribute is unable to 
meet the requirements in terms of skill, capability, and experi-
ence of its armed forces. 
Bangladesh’s Contribution to Peacekeeping 
Not all countries are willing to contribute. There has been a con-
siderable expansion in the demand for forces for UN missions in 
the last few years and the UN has frequently faced difficulty in 
recruiting the required number of forces. In 2008, for example, 
“the gap between the approved and deployed forces was 18,000 
and the deployed forces were about 77,000”. The UN office indi-
cated in November 2008 that it would approach, if confronted 
with the challenge of staffing, its major contributors such as 
Bangladesh, India and Pakistan, which had provided an increas-
ingly large proportion of the UN peacekeepers since 1998.6
Therefore, in the light of the above, it would appear that such 
action on the part of the secretary general (and his undersecre-
tary general) did not need the approval of the eneral Assembly 
and Security Council since they are not involved in deciding or 
selecting the contribution of particular member countries to the 
peacekeeping operation. This is a matter between the contribut-
ing country and the secretariat of the UN which is heavily de-
pendent on a few major donor countries for the financial re-
sources needed for such operations, and is, therefore, presumed 
to be subject to effective pressure from them.7
On receipt of the ultimatum from the UN undersecretary gen-
eral, the army chief, according to his own admission, thought 
hard about the choices he faced. On the one hand, he could assist 
the government to hold the elections by the use of force and 
thereby lose the opportunity for the participation of the army in 
the UN missions. On the other, he could intervene to change the 
nature and the composition of the interim government and thus 
postpone the elections. 
Participation in the UN peacekeeping missions, according to 
him, was an opportunity which army personnel at all levels 
looked forward to. It provided them substantial additional in-
come which was essential to supplement their meagre pay. The 
loss of this career opportunity was, in his opinion, likely to create 
great dissatisfaction among the rank and file, so much so as to 
endanger the discipline of the armed forces, as it happened dur-
ing the latter part of 1975. Thus, this career opportunity was 
e ssential for sustaining the state of morale and incentive for the 
armed forces. In view of all these considerations, the army chief 
decided that he had no alternative but to act.8
From the account of the army chief it is not clear whether the 
donors specified the form of intervention. As he narrates, there 
were two alternative ways in which he could have intervened. 
One was to abrogate the constitution and declare martial law, as 
was done in 1975 and again in 1982, and establish a full-fledged 
military government. Alternatively, the army could act within 
the formal confines of the constitution and could convince/ 
persuade the president to declare, under his own authority, an 
emergency. A government composed of civilian members, cho-
sen by the army, would be formed to run the administration 
with the help and backing of the army, so that the army would 
remain the ultimate source of power and decision-making. In 
this scenario, the army would not visibly be in-charge of run-
ning the day to day administration. Its declared objective would 
remain the h olding of new elections after the shortest interval 
and to restore parliamentary democratic processes. It was 
 rumoured that the donors opposed the abrogation of the consti-
tution and the d eclaration of martial law, even though there 
were factions within the army which preferred this alternative. 
However, the auto biography of the army chief does not put any 
light on this issue. W hatever the reason, either disagreements 
within the army or the o pposition of donors to such a course, the 
indirect route was chosen. 
The army appointed an interim civilian government which 
was to hold elections under its supervision, following changes in 
the Election Commission and in electoral rules and regulations, 
as well as the preparation of new voter rolls.
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The Peacekeeping Lever Inside the Army 
In the light of the above analysis, it may be relevant to ask 
whether the total compensation packages to the army personnel 
are indeed inadequate to recruit and maintain a contented and 
motivated army and whether, therefore, the only recourse, as ar-
gued by the army chief, is the access to additional income pro-
vided by peacekeeping operations. In this context, a few ques-
tions may be asked. What was the state of motivation and morale 
of the army till the late 1980s when there was no participation in 
peacekeeping missions?9 Was the Bangladesh army underpaid 
and deprived in those days, and hence, disgruntled and unhappy? 
Or was it that they were quite contented then but, later on, hav-
ing once enjoyed the new opportunities of additional income 
through the UN missions, they considered it as a part of their ex-
pected income? Was it, thus, a matter of heightened expectations 
rather than a necessary or essential incentive? Therefore, on the 
face of it, it was most unlikely to be such a critical factor for keep-
ing the army happy and contented. 
At the same time, there are other poor countries where the 
armed forces do not participate in the UN peacekeeping missions 
or, even if they do, their participation is very limited. It will be 
interesting to examine how are they are able to devise an incen-
tive structure that nurtures a contented army with adequate 
m orale to serve as a fighting force.
To argue that the members of the armed forces in Bangladesh 
receive a total compensation package which is lower than that 
received by the armed forces in other countries is not relevant. 
This argument applies across the board for all public services in 
Bangladesh. The compensation packages of the members of the 
public administration, both military and civil, depend on the 
level of income of a country and resources available to the gov-
ernment to pay for the entire range of public expenditures.
In this context, one may consider whether the financial re-
wards provided to the armed forces relative to the rest of the pub-
lic services/administration are lower or higher in Bangladesh 
than in other countries, developing or developed. How does their 
compensation package compare with that of members of the civil 
administration or other law-enforcing agencies and the Bangla-
desh Rifles (BDR)?10 In fact, it is widely assumed by the cognos-
centi that their total compensation packages – including access to 
health, education, housing, and other benefits such as commis-
sary privileges for purchases of consumables and other house-
hold goods – are significantly higher than those of the officers in 
the civil administration at various levels. A full description of the 
the army’s total compensation package, including benefits, cash 
and kind, is not readily available in the public domain.11
It has been suggested that a comparison of the financial re-
wards of the armed forces with the civil administration is not 
strictly appropriate because, unlike civilian officers, the armed 
forces have no opportunity to supplement their incomes through 
corruption. It could be counter-argued that the procurement of 
supplies, including the purchase of equipments and arms, in the 
defence services is not immune from corruption. In fact, Trans-
parency International, in its worldwide study, found that defence 
purchases are subject to very high degrees of corruption, because 
these purchases are highly opaque and non-transparent, the 
d efence market is not competitive and they are a matter of bilat-
eral deals between governments or between governments and 
giant defence contractors. However, it is likely that beneficiaries 
of any such corruption in defence procurements are mainly the 
upper ranks of the armed forces, whereas the benefits of corrup-
tion in the civil administration are believed to be widely preva-
lent at all levels.
The fact that participation in peacekeeping missions provides 
opportunities of financial rewards which are not available to 
other branches of the public services (except to some extent to 
the police officers) has been a subject of envy and resentment on 
the part of other public services, including the other defence- 
related services. It was widely publicised at the time of the recent 
mutiny in the BDR that one of their grievances was that they did 
not get to participate in UN peacekeeping missions, even though 
they were capable of taking part in them. 
Above all, it cannot be assumed that the UN peacekeeping mis-
sions would be available on a regular basis for all the years to 
come. What would happen if, in future, the opportunities for 
p articipating in peacekeeping missions are reduced or eliminated 
for reasons unrelated to developments in Bangladesh?
In 2009, for example, about 10,000 members of the army were 
employed in such missions. This is almost 7% of the total armed 
forces, if we estimate the total number of army personnel at about 
1,50,000. This would not be the case, for example, of Pakistan or 
India which had sent a similar number of army personnel to UN 
peacekeeping missions, since they both have much larger armies 
than Bangladesh.12
After all to have a large percentage of the armed forces engaged 
in peacekeeping missions implies that effectively the size of the 
operational forces at a given moment of time is less than its nomi-
nal strength and to that extent therefore the defence needs of 
the country are uncovered. Alternatively, it could also imply that 
the size of the army is larger than what is needed for defence. 
Under the circumstances, if it is really considered that the total 
compensation packages is not adequate for the maintenance of a 
well-motivated army, then the matter should be treated in a com-
prehensive and systematic manner. 
If the compensation package for army personnel has to be in-
creased, then either total defence expenditures have to be in-
creased or the size of the army has to be reduced to keep defence 
expenditures unchanged. The appropriate size of the army has to 
be determined in the light of a proper evaluation of the defence 
needs of the country as well as its resources. In turn, the appro-
priate size of an army depends on such considerations as the 
n ature of the external threat, the type of operations it is likely to 
be involved, as well as the nature and strength of the countries 
against which it has to defend itself. The security needs of the 
country also include the ability to guard against and prevent the 
possibility of internal subversion by extremist groups – often 
heavily armed – a rising phenomenon in recent times. There are 
various ways in which the variety of security needs can be met 
with implications for the size and composition of the armed 
forces. An appropriate assessment of security needs is vital but 
ultimately it is a political decision, because it involves alternative 
use of scarce resources available to the government. 
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Implications for Domestic Politics
If the UN peacekeeping missions are considered so vital for the 
army and if the donors financing such missions can decide their 
participation, it can be argued that the latter can exert influence 
on the army, any time if they so decide to intervene in shaping 
the political developments inside Bangladesh. They can deter-
mine not only the timing of interventions by the army but also 
the nature and duration of such interventions.13 
What are the implications of such interventions by the UN 
Peacekeeping Operations Office, apparently itself a proxy for the 
donors financing such operations, on domestic political develop-
ments? Does the recent example open the way to future interven-
tions which are not necessarily in the interest of the country or 
desired by the population in general, but are dictated by the geo-
political or strategic interests of the major powers? 
It may be argued that the threat of suspension of participation in 
UN missions can be used only under very special circumstances. 
First, there has to be an agreement among the principal donors – 
currently the US and member states of the EU – as to the need for 
such intervention. Second, such an intervention needs to find wide 
acceptance within the public. There was strong public support in 
Bangladesh for the restoration of law and order as a prelude to 
free, fair and peaceful elections with the participation of all politi-
cal parties. These were not very common or usual circumstances. 
In any case, it is a debatable question, whether it is desirable to 
have the army, with a monopoly of control over the use of force, to 
be exposed to such strong, even irresistible, pressure from powerful 
donor countries to intervene in domestic political developments.
In the particular case being discussed, army intervention, for-
tunately, did soon come to an end and parliamentary democracy, 
with warts and all, was restored within a period of two years. 
However, there was a growing public opinion that the duration of 
the army-backed government was too long and, till the end, there 
was a great deal of speculation about whether and when the elec-
tions would be held. This was because, soon after it took over 
power, it appeared that the army had a bigger agenda than to 
merely hold fair and free elections. They seemed to have the ob-
jective of changing the political landscape by engineering a 
change in the leadership of the two political parties as well as by 
reforms in their internal governance. They also encouraged for-
mation of new political parties, which, however, did not materi-
alise. Gradually, other related items were added to the agenda of 
military backed rule – such as the reform of the judiciary, elected 
local governments with wide administrative and financial pow-
ers and a large variety of institutional reforms. A large-scale anti-
corruption drive was undertaken to prosecute corrupt politicians 
and associated bureaucrats. However, the anti-corruption drive 
was perceived to have been carried out in many cases without re-
gard to the due processes of law and soon this drive petered out. 
The sustainability of long-run political and administrative re-
forms undertaken by the interim government was questioned 
and seen as a means to extend its duration. There were also re-
ports of abuse of powers, if not outright corruption, among lower 
and mid-level army officers who seemed to wield considerable 
power over civil administrations, especially in the districts. This 
was no surprise. As happens all over the world, when the military 
gets involved in political decision-making and civil administra-
tion, they tend to acquire all the vices endemic in the political 
culture and traditions of that country. In the meanwhile, the 
world food crisis, aggravated by shortfalls in domestic food pro-
duction, rising food prices and overall inflationary pressure in 
the economy, reflected adversely on the performance, as well as, 
the legitimacy of the army-backed interim government. Popular 
support for the army-backed interim government, evident in 
early 2007, began to erode by 2008.
All these developments tended to alienate and disillusion the 
public as well as question the legitimacy of the army. There were 
indications that opinions within the army were not quite unified 
about the duration and purpose of their regime. A few actions 
taken in the early days were soon reversed. Reports circulated 
that hardliners within the army wanted to continue in power for 
a longer period, while others preferred to hold free and fair elec-
tions within a short period of time and restore political power to 
the winners. The donors, who originally urged and supported 
army intervention for cancelling the highly controversial elec-
tions, started to exert pressure – through public expressions and 
private meetings – urging the military backed government to hold 
elections and restore democracy as early as possible. However, it is 
conceivable that the donors, having once urged the army to inter-
vene in the political process, may have continued to support a 
longer period of army-backed rule. But the evolving situation, 
both economic and political, was fraught with uncertainty. In the 
end, those factions within the army who favoured withdrawal, as 
well as the revised strategy of the donors, won the day.14 
Bangladesh is now more or less back where it was before the 
beginning of the crisis, excepting that free and fair elections were 
held on the basis of a reliable voters’ list. The political clock has 
been reset where as it was in 2006. The two years of interregnum 
produced no net gain insofar as a democratic political evolution 
was concerned. A consensual political process, in which political 
parties compete and do not confront each other and in which 
“the winner does not take all”, has not emerged. There appears to 
be no qualitative change in the political process. This experience 
confirms the viewpoint that army interventions rarely succeed in 
redesigning the political landscape and in establishing the requi-
site rules of democratic governance. 
Alternative Scenarios
It is worth considering whether, in reaction to the threat of non-
participation in UN peacekeeping missions, the army leadership 
could have avoided the effective takeover of civilian government. 
It is possible to postulate an alternative scenario where the army 
decides to retain complete neutrality in disputes between politi-
cal parties. During the latter part of 2006, when negotiations 
were underway among the political parties, the army could have 
made it clear that it was not their role to intervene in political 
disputes – neither to arbitrate between the political parties nor 
intervene on behalf of one against the other. The leadership of 
the army should have approached Khaleda Zia, the then prime 
minister, and conveyed to her that she could not depend on them 
to facilitate elections by suppressing the opposition parties. If 
Khaleda Zia would have been convinced that the army, under no 
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circumstance, would intervene on her behalf, it was most likely 
that she would have compromised with her political opponents 
and come to a mutually acceptable arrangement. She would not 
have been able to suppress the opposition parties and hold elec-
tions with the help of the police alone. It was likely that both the 
parties would have mobilised their supporters and brought large 
crowds out in the streets, perhaps with the possibility of their 
turning violent, but they would have matched each other. There 
would have been street fights but without conclusive results. 
Khaleda Zia would have been left with no choice but to compro-
mise. If the army leadership was united in its resolve not to inter-
vene on her behalf, there would have been no elections without a 
compromise with the opposition parties. There would have been 
no need for the UN peacekeeping office to intervene and to put 
strong pressure on the army not to facilitate the elections sched-
uled for January 2007. 
Is this scenario realistic or is it too optimistic? An alternative 
scenario could be that even if the army remained neutral and did 
not intervene, the president – an appointee of the then govern-
ment – could have proceeded to hold elections with the help of the 
workers/supporters of the government, who were not totally with-
out access to arms and, in any case, were likely to be better armed 
than the opposition party workers and supporters. In the extreme 
case, it is conceivable that elections could have been held without 
the participation of the opposition and, in their aftermath, there 
would have been violent clashes between the two parties. 
Clashes between the political parties might have continued una-
bated. In any case, normal economic activities would have been 
seriously hampered and the donors would be unlikely to con-
tinue business as usual under these highly u nstable conditions.
Under such circumstances, it would have been likely that there 
would have been mounting pressure for a political compromise, 
including the holding of new elections with the participation of 
both the parties. In the meantime, however, it is most likely that 
the country would have suffered from the disruption of normal 
life and of economic activities, possibly including loss of life. 
There continue to be differences of opinion in the country on the 
relative likelihood of these alternative scenarios.
Why did the army decide not to remain neutral? This was prob-
ably for two distinct reasons. Either because there were divisions 
within the top leadership of the army regarding support for the 
incumbent government’s decision to hold elections, or because 
there was consensus within the army leadership that army rule 
was preferable in the circumstances. The pressures by the UN 
tilted the balance in favour of those who were not willing to sup-
port Khaleda Zia’s untenable elections and were also eager to in-
tervene. There was no support for complete neutrality within the 
army. If there was unity in the army in favour of and a commit-
ment to neutrality, there would have been no room for the UN 
and other foreign intervention.
The opposition Awami League accepted army intervention be-
cause Khaleda Zia’s compromised elections were cancelled and a 
promise was made by the army about new elections, with a new 
voters’ list to be established by a new Election Commission. The 
Awami League, however, wanted the army to withdraw from 
power, after holding free and fair elections, leaving the reigns of 
the government with the winners. This has not been the way that 
army interverntions have ended, in the past, in Bangladesh or any-
where else. Usually, once the army intervenes in the political pr o-
cess, they tend to continue in power. Bangladesh did eventually 
escape this fate, as explained earlier, due to a set of factors which 
included donor pressure, deteriorating economic circumstances as 
well as divisions within the army. Despite some apprehensions, 
army intervention did not last more than two years. The army did 
agree to surrender power to the winning party in the elections. 
But, in the final analysis, the principle of army intervention in poli-
tics remained unchanged and unchallenged. The principle of its 
complete neutrality in political disputes was not established.
Tradition of Army Dependant Politics
The tradition of the Bangladesh army during the past three dec-
ades had been that it has lost no opportunity to engage in political 
manoeuvring, either directly or indirectly. It somehow always felt 
that it had the responsibility to take hold of the errant politicians 
and set them right in the way they seemed fit. Even though the 
army establishment retreated from an overt political role since 
1991, it has not remained a neutral or uninterested observer of the 
political scene. Habits built over a decade and a half (1975-91) 
could not be so easily broken. Having exercised unrivalled, un-
trammelled, power for such a long period, they felt they had the 
ultimate authority to supersede civilian governments whenever, in 
their opinion, the affairs of the state went astray, specially since 
they had developed a very low opinion of politicians in general.
The politicians, on their part, did not learn the rules of demo-
cratic politics to settle disputes – negotiation, persuation and com-
promise by a process of give and take – in order to reach a working 
consensus. For most of the period since 1947, when Bangladesh 
was part of Pakistan, there have been military governments. Also, 
after a short interregnum of democratic politics in the unstable 
years in the immediate post-independence period, Bangladesh 
went through a long period (1975-91) when the military ruled the 
country with the cooperation of civil servants. For the most part, 
there was the facade of a powerless parliament, consisting of an 
assortment of politicians often grouped into parties, elected 
through “managed’ elections, playing a secondary, supportive role 
to the military ruler, to provide him with an aura of legitimacy. 
Looking back to the restoration of democratic politics in 1991, 
politicians had a window of opportunity to learn the basic “rules of 
the game” for parliamentary democracy. But it was not to be. The 
policy of “give and take” or compromise was not followed; it was 
the principle of “winner takes all” that obtained, making confronta-
tion between political parties the norm. The period for learning the 
principles of democratic politics was too short and it was inter-
rupted. Moreover, there was not much democracy inside the politi-
cal parties themselves, which were run by strong leaders who en-
joyed great popularity among the masses. They commanded un-
questioned allegiance of the rank and file of their respective parties 
across the country and consequently wielded considerable powers. 
Local politicians or aspiring parliamentarians in each party, there-
fore, focused all their energies on gaining the support of their re-
spective party leaders rather than building up independent popular 
support in their own constituencies. The result was that whoever 
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succeeded in receiving the blessings and support of their party’s 
sole leader won the support of the party workers at the grass roots. 
The two major political parties that occupied centre stage in the 
post-1991 period started to vie with each other to keep the army 
happy and favourably disposed towards them. When in power, 
they made generous allocation of resources and privileges to the 
army, including sanctioning a disproportionate numbers of high-
level positions – brigadiers and generals – in relation to the size of 
the army. Thus, they competed to win the loyalty, if not explicit 
support, of the army in their search for political power. In this 
competition for army support, one party, started by a general-
turned politician, was perceived to have a close relationship, 
since the mid-1970s, with the rank and file of the army. For this 
party it was a matter of sustaining and strengthening its histori-
cally close relationship. The other political party, whose leader 
was assassinated by an army coup in 1975, started with an initial 
disadvantage, in the post-1991 period, but worked hard to neu-
tralise mutual mistrust and to repair their uneasy relationship. It 
faced a difficult task to gain the confidence of the army in view of 
this controversial historical legacy. 
When in power, however, each party sought to make appoint-
ments in the top leadership of the army which they deemed to be 
sympathetic towards them. In the process, they encouraged fac-
tionalism within the army, an unwholesome feature which mili-
tated against its professionalism. Accordingly, the relationship of 
the army with the government of the day often seemed to depend 
on how or which direction the top leadership of the army tilted 
and on the degree of control that the army leadership exercised 
over the rank and file. In short, it continued and strengthened the 
politicisation of the army.
Way Out of This Trap?
There was no consensus among the political parties that under 
no circumstances – no matter how extreme the disagreements 
amongst them – would they seek army intervention or help. They 
did not seem to recognise that once the army intervened to keep 
a political party in power, the party necessarily surrendered a 
part of its authority and power to the army. 
In the absence of a consensus – both among the political par-
ties and the army – that the military should have not role to play 
in the domain of politics, Bangladesh is caught in the trap of peri-
odic military interventions in the political process, on the one 
hand, and of weak elected governments, on the other.
How to get out of this trap? There is an additional complicating 
factor in the process of political development. A view prevalent 
among large, if not all, sections of Bangladesh civil society, spe-
cially professionals and retired civil officials of all stripes and 
l evels, that the solution to the misgovernance by the politicians – 
inefficient policies, abuse of power, corruption – is military rule.15 
In Bangladesh, many of these people have participated in 
p olicymaking roles in army governments, increasing their com-
fort levels with military rule. 
Two possible explanations have been offered for this. One is 
that military governments are considered by professionals to be 
more stable, efficient and less dishonest than civilian rule in de-
mocracies. The civillian governments have often been unstable 
because of shifting coalitions between multiple political parties 
or because of confrontational manoeuvring between the two 
main dominant parties. In contrast, once development-oriented 
policies are accepted by an autocratic military government, they 
can be implemented expeditiously and effectively, with less hin-
drance from special interest groups, than would be possible un-
der a democratically elected civilian government based on a coa-
lition of parties. The military government does not need to ac-
commodate multiplicity of interest groups or competing points of 
view. In a democratic process, divergent viewpoints need to reach 
a compromise or consensus and governments often need to elicit 
wide public support for proposed measures. The process of policy 
formulation and its implementation in a democratic regime is 
thus considered clumsy, cumbersome, and time-consuming and 
is full of uncertainties. In this line of reasoning, socio-economic 
development gets higher priority than the evolution of a partici-
patory and accountable democratic society. In this view, in poor 
countries, democracy can wait but development cannot. 
The example of rapid development in the east Asian countries 
under autocratic regimes is often cited in this context. But there 
were special historical circumstances – the threat of internal sub-
version posed by communism and/or external aggression loomed 
very large in these countries – which provided their authoritarian 
regimes incentives to become development-oriented. They had 
an implicit bargain with the people, in which in order to retain 
their legitimacy these regimes focused on delivering economic 
growth in lieu of political freedom.16 
The additional reason why many civil society members are in 
favour of a military government is that it is much easier for the 
professionals and experts to attain positions of decision-making 
power and authority in a such a dispensation. In civilian govern-
ments, they need to go through the process of gaining acceptance 
by the political parties and having to compete and struggle to rise 
through the ranks to the positions of prominence or authority. 
This is a risky and uncertain path and requires high human skills, 
such as the ability to persuade, negotiate and lead, as well as to 
forge compromises between conflicting or opposing viewpoints 
or groups. These are qualities which, often, are not possessed by 
technical experts.
It is not necessary that military rulers would be development- 
oriented. They often turn out to be corrupt. They often divert 
national resources towards the distribution of favours and privi-
leges to members of the armed forces especially the higher eche-
lons in the army, to retain their support and remain in power. 
Also, brute force over the civillian population does not usually 
sustain them in power for any length in time. They need to have 
at least acquiescence, if not the support, of the people. Therefore, 
they tend to co-opt, by the misuse of resources and patronage, 
the powerful sectors of the society comprised largely of civil serv-
ants, commercial and industrial magnates and other important 
elements of the elite.
History is replete with examples where the authoritarian 
p olitical regimes have not been sustained in the long run in the 
absence of popular support and legitimacy. Frequently, one 
a uthoritarian regime is replaced by another which merely adds to 
the larger instability. There are often rifts and competition within 
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the military establishment itself over power-sharing. When the 
military regimes collapse, often the economic and social gains 
obtained under their reign are lost. Their end is marked by 
e conomic decline. 
In fact, the most important shortcoming of an authoritarian 
regime is the absence of a process for the peaceful transfer of 
power through an orderly method of succession. This absence 
creates unpredictability. The transition in Bangladesh from the 
first military government of Zia-ur Rahman to the next took 
place in 1981 through a procession of coups and counter-coups. 
But the transition from the next military-backed government 
to a democratic one took place in 1991 after weeks of mass pro-
tests and demonstrations but without much bloodshed, prima-
rily b ecause the army declined to put down popular protests. 
There are few examples where authoritarian regimes are suc-
ceeded peacefully by democratic governments without going 
through a period of instability and without losing the past gains 
in development.
More Democracy as an Answer to Bad Democracy
Experience all over the world is a stark reminder that there are 
no short cuts to representative and accountable government, 
except through a messy, sometimes confusing or rambling, 
process of political evolution. It is a well known dictum that 
democracy is not the best form of government but the alterna-
tives to democracy are much worse. A certain amount of politi-
cal confrontations, sometimes not perfectly peaceful, between 
opposing political forces cannot be avoided in immature de-
mocracies. The learning process in the evolution of democracy 
is tumultuous and may be long depending on the circumstances 
of each country. 
Bangladesh cannot escape the fate of many young democra-
cies going through a gradual, often stop and go, process of 
e stablishing the rule of law, independent judiciary, free media 
and effective government. The path would not be smooth but 
bumpy, often marked by instability and setbacks. The objective 
should be to keep the degree of instability within limits through 
compromises and alliances. Any attempt to interrupt the proc-
ess does not help. As we have seen in the last 30 years or so, 
after every military i ntervention we have to relearn or start 
over again to learn or build up the rules of the game of a demo-
cratic society. 
As Bangladesh looks to the future, following the recent demo-
cratic restoration, the various sections of civil society must seek 
to analyse the past developments and draw lessons which should 
be widely debated. Civil society members have to re-examine 
their preconceptions. They need to be united in the conviction 
that the response to flawed democracy is not less but more de-
mocracy. Constant vigilance in the price of liberty. By a system-
atic public educational campaign by all sections of civil society, 
there must be a concerted effort to generate strong public opinion 
against periodic military interventions in politics, no matter what 
the state of disputes among politicians.
While Bangladesh continues to go through a process of demo-
cratic evolution, there must be a concerted effort to aggressively 
expand education; a more efficient and equitable education than 
at present to raise awareness about the importance of participa-
tory decision-making. As economic development proceeds, the 
middle class is expected to expand. A large and educated middle 
class is the sine qua non of democratic politics. A large middle 
class cannot easily be co-opted by an autocratic regime. The re-
sources necessary to co-opt a large middle class through a system 
of patronage distribution by an army-backed autocratic regime 
are not available in Bangladesh. A wide participatory democratic 
process is necessary to accommodate the divergent viewpoints of 
a large middle class and their desire for participation in the 
p olitical and economic decision-making process.17 
Also, it is worth examining whether certain features, which 
have been incorporated in the constitution of Bangladesh, need 
to be modified. There is a growing feeling among many, knowl-
edgeable people that such a re-examination is necessary. To pro-
vide one example, it is argued that a concentration of power in 
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the hands of a prime minister may unduly limit the power of the 
cabinet and parliament. We seem to have ended up converting a 
de  jure parliamentary system into a de  facto presidential system, 
without the safeguards or advantages of either. This is especially 
so in view of the lack of adequate participatory processes and 
procedures or checks-and-balances in the internal governance of 
political parties themselves. The powers of a president in a presi-
dential system are constrained in a system of checks and bal-
ances, like an independently elected parliament and an inde-
pendent judiciary. In a parliamentary system, it is arguable, that 
the prime minister, in control of the political party with a major-
ity in the parliament, can govern like an absolute ruler. Also, it 
may be necessary examine whether the Bangladesh president 
should not be elected on the basis of a consensus between all 
p olitical parties rather than being a nominee of the majority 
party in parliament, and hence subservient to the prime minister. 
Similarly, the local elected government institutions have histori-
cally been a major source of political pluralism since they are 
 often i ndependent of central government control, and it is not 
necessary that they would belong to the same party. Further, 
d ecentralisation of political power in local government allows 
people’s wider participation in governance and thus makes local 
government more responsive.
These and other similar issues can be examined by a constitu-
tional commission, to be established consisting of selected ex-
perts and members of civil society. To argue that irrespective of 
the system, constitutional arrangements can be subverted by 
politicians when they do not have convictions in the democratic 
process, is a gross exaggeration. The constitutional arrangements 
and rules are not a sufficient but necessary condition. The theory 
and practice of organisation – both political and administrative 
– suggests that they do have a role in modifying and changing 
behaviour. There is no perfect answer and experimentation 
may be necessary. While various reform proposals have been 
discussed in Bangladesh in the past, there is no pressure to ex-
amine them in a serious way. This is a challenge, as well as op-
portunity, for the wider civil society, provided they have the 
necessary and firm convictions about the need for such reforms 
and are eager to play an active and enthusiastic role to mobilise 
public opinion for this purpose.
Notes
 1 Bangladesh has so far participated in 45 of the 63 
peacekeeping missions of the UN, which include 
30 completed ones. So far 76,000 peacekeepers 
from Bangladesh have completed their UN mis-
sions. Bangladesh has developed a system for 
training and preparing the forces for these UN 
missions. UN training modules are built into the 
unit and formation training programmes by the 
Bangladesh Institute of Peace Support Opera-
tions (BIPSOT). A contingent is mobilised 90 
days before the scheduled deployment in a 
m ission, in order to provide consolidated train-
ing focusing on the mission requirement and to 
prepare it logistically. This has helped to 
m aintain a high standard of professionalism and 
commitment.  
  Hopefully it also added to the foreign exchange 
earnings of the country insofar as (a) the mis-
sion participants remitted some part of the in-
come home, and (b) the government received 
the overhead charges from the UN on amount of 
the services provided by Bangladesh. Not much is 
known in the public domain about the quanti-
tative magnitude of the Bangladesh’s foreign 
e xchange earnings.
 2 The range of wild rumours varied from the UN 
asking the army leadership to withdraw support 
from the government to the UN urging it to install 
a military government through a coup.
 3 The Daily Star, 15 September 2009.
 4 M U Ahmed, Shantir Shapne, Shamayer Sriticha­
ran (Bengali), 2009, Dhaka, pp 331-39.
 5 As mentioned earlier, the UN Secretary General 
himself appealed in the latter part of 2006 for a 
peaceful settlement of the political stalemate in 
Bangladesh.
 6 There are a limited number of countries that pro-
vide troops and police with needed capability to 
meet current needs, and some potential contribu-
tors may be unwilling to provide forces for a new 
operation due to such political factors as their 
own national security and the environmental and 
security situation in the host country. … the diffi-
culty of obtaining needed personnel and resourc-
es has had an impact on the abilities of ongoing 
operation to fully execute their mandates… It is a 
consistent case of demand exceeding supply of 
peacekeeping forces. The three countries which 
seem to be leaders in both having the ability and 
the willingness to participate are Bangladesh, 
I ndia, and Pakistan. United States Government 
Accountability Office, UN Peacekeeping Report to 
the Committee on Foreign Relations, US Senate, 
2008, pp 22-24.
 7 It is to be noted that the most important donors of 
the peacekeeping operation were the United 
States, the European countries, and Japan. In 
2003, the list of major financiers on the basis of 
their assessed contributions decided by the UN 
General Assembly was as follows: United States 
(approximately 27%), Japan (19.5%), the Nether-
lands (17%), Germany (8.7%), France (7.3%), UK 
(7.4%), Italy (4.9%), Canada (2.8%), and Sweden 
(2.0%). Significantly, all are donors to Bangla-
desh. (United Nations General Assembly, 58th 
Session, Implementation of General Assembly 
Resolution 55/235 and 55/236. Report of the Sec-
retary General, 17 December 2003). The meeting 
in September 2009 at the UN, presided over by 
the United States, to which the heads of govern-
ments of 10 leading contributors (including Bang-
ladesh) were invited to discuss their contributions 
to UN peacekeeping forces has demonstrated the 
urgency of “excess demand” for such forces.
 8 He describes in his book how he strove within the 
limits of the army’s resources to provide various 
extra facilities and perks for the army such as sev-
eral high quality guest/rest houses for their rest 
and recreation, in very beautiful and scenic loca-
tions across the country, as well as generous 
f acilities in the golf club in Dhaka cantonment, 
etc. These were all intended to keep the army 
happy and its morale high.
 9 The Bangladesh Army started participating in 
peacekeeping missions only in 1988 (The Daily 
Star, 25 September 2009).
10 Bangladesh Rifles, a border security force. 
11  In this context, it needs to be mentioned that a 
large number of enterprises, commercial and in-
dustrial, are owned by the Bangladesh army as an 
institution. It is not known how and to what ex-
tent that the members of the armed forces partici-
pate in the ownership of these enterprises, and 
how and to what extent they benefit directly or 
indirectly from the income and profits of these.
12  Since 1988, Bangladesh had contributed nearly 
82,966 peacekeeping forces in total over this 
whole period (The Daily Star, 25 September 
2009). 
13  There were examples in the past where the major 
powers have encouraged or engineered army 
i nterventions in developing countries to destabi-
lise or dislodge civil governments which they dis-
liked. But in those cases, usually the armed forces 
of the particular country had close relations with 
the defence forces of one or two major powers.
14  Usually in the past, even though the promise of an 
early election to restore a democratic government 
was always made, army rule (direct/indirect) 
continued for a long time. It happened in Bangla-
desh between 1975 and 1982.
15  In the post-war period, military governments in 
many developing countries of east Asia, Latin 
America and Africa have often been actively 
s upported by the intellectuals and professionals.
16  Michael Schuman, The Miracle: The Epic Story of Asia’s 
Quest for Wealth (New York: Harper C ollins, 2009).
17  Democracy is conditional upon a large, educated, 
and articulate middle class – accustomed to think-
ing for themselves – which itself depends on eco-
nomic growth. Developments bring structural 
change in the economy involving technical change 
and industrialisation moving labour force into oc-
cupations that require independent thinking, initia-
tive and judgment on the job; it makes people more 
articulate; development transforms people’s values 
and motivations, makes them desire free choice 
and participation in decisions affecting their lives. 
They are better equipped to intervene in politics. 
Among the countries that democratised during 
1970 and 1990, democracy survived in every coun-
try that made the transition when it was at the in-
come level of Argentina of today (1990s) or higher. 
Among the countries that made the transition when 
they were below that level democracy had an aver-
age life expectancy of only eight years (Inglebast 
and  Wetzel, “How Development Leads to Demo-
cracy – What We Know About Modernisation”, 
F oreign Affairs, Vol  88, No 2, March/April 2009). 
I ndia, as a low-income country, is an exception to 
this generalisation. It started the process of demo-
cratic transition right after independence, and con-
tinued u ninter rupted for the next 60 years or so. 
India inherited in 1947 vibrant political parties 
which had started in late 19th century in British In-
dia and and gained some experience in limited self-
government during the colonial period. The transi-
tion is not yet complete. For the exceptional factors 
which have characterised the evolution of the dem-
ocratic process in India, see Ramchandra Guha 
(2007) India After: The History of the World’s Lar­
gest Democracy (New Delhi: Harper Collins). 
